

UDC 355.45



V. Yemanov



V. Trobiuk



S. Bielai

### **THEORETICAL AND ORGANISATIONAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERACTION BETWEEN THE COMPONENTS OF THE SECURITY AND DEFENCE SECTOR IN THE PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION OF TERRITORIAL DEFENCE MEASURES**

*The relevance of the study of the theoretical and organisational foundations of interaction between the components of the security and defence sector in the planning and implementation of territorial defence measures is proved. The content of preparation for territorial defence measures is revealed. The tasks of organising interaction in territorial defence are defined. The tasks of territorial defence, which are performed jointly by the components of the security and defence sector, are investigated. Directions for further scientific research are provided.*

**Keywords:** territorial defence, organisation of interaction, security and defence sector, governing bodies, critical facilities, sabotage and reconnaissance forces

**Statement of the problem.** Despite the fact that the doctrinal attitudes and strategic concepts of most of the world's leading powers consider war as the greatest national misfortune and threat to the existence of mankind, military force remains a traditional means of achieving political goals. Therefore, the protection of Ukraine's sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and inviolability of borders remain the most important tasks for the security sector.

The anti-terrorist operation in 2014, followed by the Joint Forces Operation in 2018, and the repulsion of Russia's large-scale armed aggression in 2022 have placed a certain responsibility for the defence of the state on all components of the security and defence sector. At the same time, they are faced with tasks that cannot be solved using outdated methods. Changes in the nature of assigned tasks in an armed conflict naturally necessitate the improvement of forms and methods of combat use of the security sector components.

In the overall system of national security of the state, one of the most important and complex tasks is territorial defence, both in the whole territory and in its individual regions. At the present stage, this issue is of particular importance for Ukraine. This is primarily due to the economic, social and political changes that have occurred in the world and in our country over the past decade, new views on the development and use of forces and means in modern wars and armed conflicts. In the context of a decreasing threat of a global nuclear war, developed countries are increasingly paying attention to the development and adoption of new weapons, improvement of existing ones and search for new forms and methods of armed struggle, including the widespread use of unconventional weapons and sabotage and reconnaissance activities.

In modern warfare, the importance of troop interaction has increased dramatically. This is due to a number of circumstances of both military-political and military-technical nature. Firstly, the reduction of armaments, the process of reforming the military organisation of the state aimed at quantitative and qualitative changes in their composition, have determined the need to find new ways to improve the effectiveness of military formations. Secondly, the leading countries of the world are looking for new ways to increase the effectiveness of the use of armed struggle to achieve the goals of war. Intensive work is underway to create new and modernise means of armed struggle, and to improve the tactics of their combat use. Therefore, in these conditions, improving the organisation of interaction between troops at all levels – from operational to tactical – is one of the most rational ways to increase the capabilities of the Military Organisation of the state to counter both external and internal threats.

© V. Yemanov, V. Trobiuk, S. Bielai, 2024

**Analysis of recent research and publications.** The analysis of existing studies [1–3] and regulations [4, 5] related to the country's territorial defence shows that there is a need for further clarification and generalisation of the main theoretical provisions on territorial defence, such as the definition, purpose and tasks of territorial defence and identification of trends in its development, principles of preparation and conduct, and on their basis, improvement of the territorial defence system. This should take into account the main trends in the development of military and political conditions and factors in the world, at the regional and sub-regional levels, the views of foreign experts on the possible nature and methods of waging wars and armed conflicts, the geopolitical and geostrategic position of Ukraine, as well as its economic and mobilisation capabilities and a number of other factors. In these circumstances, when preparing the components of the security and defence sector to repel aggression, it becomes necessary to plan and implement territorial defence measures in close cooperation between military formations, law enforcement agencies and public authorities.

**The purpose of the article** is to study the theoretical and organisational foundations of interaction between the components of the security and defence sector in the course of planning and implementation of territorial defence measures and to provide relevant proposals for their improvement.

**Summary of the main material.** One of the conditions for the successful conduct of territorial defence is the organisation and maintenance of interaction between the troops, forces and means involved in it. When organising the interaction of the components of the security and defence sector in territorial defence, it is important, first of all, to take into account the complexity of its content and structure, significant changes in the quantitative and qualitative composition, combat capabilities of the troops participating in territorial defence, the large spatial scope of its conduct, as well as the qualitative development of command and control systems. All of this greatly complicates the organisation of interaction, its content, planning and methods of practical training.

Under current conditions, the preparation and conduct of territorial defence is significantly influenced by a number of economic, social, political, informational and military factors, which are determined by the views on the preparation and conduct of territorial defence, the enemy's capabilities to destabilise it, the capabilities of its troops (military formations), forces and means, the level of development of the country's infrastructure, etc.

They can be grouped into several groups for detailed consideration. The first group includes the conditions and factors that follow from the analysis of the capabilities of an eventual enemy and affect the troops (military formations) of territorial defence and important objects. The second group consists of factors that are caused by the economic and socio-political state of the state. The third group includes conditions and factors related to the state of the state's infrastructure, operational equipment of its territory and physical and geographical conditions of the country. The fourth group consists of factors that combine the state and trends in the development of views on the preparation and conduct of territorial defence. The degree of influence of conditions and factors on the preparation and conduct of territorial defence varies depending on changes in the military-political situation, the level of development of the state's economy and the armed forces of the opposing parties, the state of infrastructure and operational equipment of the country's territory.

The problem of interaction in the joint use of heterogeneous forces and means is of a historical nature. With the development of means, forms and methods of armed struggle, it is becoming increasingly important. The solution to this problem at present shows that interaction, on the one hand, is one of the principles of military art and, on the other hand, is the practical activity of commanders and staffs in organising and carrying out joint combat operations of various forces and means. The effectiveness of performing tasks in territorial defence will depend on a number of factors, one of which is the level of coordination of troops, especially when performing joint tasks. Preparation of territorial defence is divided into advance and direct.

Advance preparation is carried out in peacetime. The decision on territorial defence is made and its planning is carried out, and the tasks of territorial defence are communicated to ministries, agencies, components of the security and defence sector, local governments, including state administrations. A set of practical measures is taken to prepare for the deployment of territorial defence.

Direct preparation is carried out during a threatening period, when the components of the security and defence sector are transferred from peacetime to martial law, and in the event of a sudden enemy attack – with the beginning of aggression in the shortest possible time. At the same time, plans for territorial defence are refined, tasks are communicated to all units, troops (forces) and assets are deployed in designated areas (facilities), their subordination is carried out, and the protection and defence of all facilities is strengthened, as provided for in the plans for territorial defence.

The task of organising interaction in territorial defence will be to coordinate the actions of the components

of the security and defence sector in the joint performance of tasks; organise the use of troops, taking into account their specific characteristics, in the independent performance of tasks or in cooperation with other formations.

At the same time, the content of the organisation of cooperation will include coordination and determination of the procedure and methods of joint actions in the following areas: search and destruction of sabotage and reconnaissance groups and other anti-state armed formations; repulsion of attacks by enemy airborne and sabotage and reconnaissance forces on protected facilities; anti-landing operations; protection of the rear of operating troops; maintenance of martial law; participation in operational cover for the deployment of troops.

In addition, the organisation of interaction will include: determining the procedure for transferring units to operational subordination to troops and vice versa (when strengthening the protection and defence of important state facilities); agreeing on the mutual exchange of information between headquarters and troops on the situation; determining the procedure for communication between command and control bodies and troops; establishing a unified system of signals, mutual recognition, interaction and warning; determining measures to ensure comprehensive support for troops.

At the same time, the need to improve the organisation of troop interaction is currently due to a number of factors.

Given the internal political situation, economic capabilities of the state, the main direction of reorganisation of the state's military formations will be the creation of small but mobile, combat-ready troops capable of creating joint operational groups of troops in case of armed conflicts (threat of armed conflicts) in threatening areas. At the same time, the priority areas for the development of the state's military formations will be: improving the organisational and staffing structure and optimising the number of military formations and law enforcement agencies; maintaining constant combat readiness and combat capability of troops and law enforcement agencies at a level that ensures the effective performance of tasks by troops and law enforcement agencies in different conditions through close cooperation with each other; improving the level of work of command and control bodies and skilful leadership of subordinate troops.

The need to improve the organisation of interaction is also due to the fact that, having a number of common tasks, the components of the security and defence sector belong to different law enforcement agencies and, if interaction is not organised (disrupted), they will solve their tasks autonomously. The analysis of the experience of local wars and conflicts gained during the years of Ukraine's independence, as well as the experience of service and combat activities of military formations and law enforcement agencies of the state, shows that it is virtually impossible to solve these tasks independently. This not only fails to produce the desired results, but also leads to duplication of structural elements of one another, expenditure of additional funds, and in some cases increases the threat to national interests and leads to other negative consequences. This is especially true at present, when the organisational structure and number of components of the security and defence sector are being optimised while maintaining the scope of tasks performed.

The experience of modern local conflicts and military operations shows that the capabilities of the security and defence sector components are not sufficient to effectively address territorial defence tasks if they are performed independently, which requires the involvement of additional forces and means. Let us dwell in more detail on the tasks of territorial defence performed jointly by the components of the security and defence sector.

The task of repelling an attack on critical facilities requires special attention. The development of methods of armed struggle, command and control systems, the development and improvement of high-precision weapons and the increase in the combat capabilities of troops on this basis inevitably leads to the emergence of new forms and methods of their use. The content of the concept of "protection of important state facilities" remains controversial to this day. As the analysis has shown, the concepts of "protection of important state objects" and "operational cover" are often not distinguished from each other, and the concept of "protection of important state objects" is identified with the concept of their defence. Therefore, let us dwell on them in more detail.

Operational cover is a set of measures carried out in the areas of future actions of operational units to repel enemy aggression and ensure the organised entry into battle of the main forces intended for a defensive operation.

Cover of important state facilities is carried out continuously and throughout the territory, not only during the preparation of a defensive operation. Thus, firstly, operational cover is an integral part of the cover of important state facilities, and secondly, the duration of operational cover is determined by the time required for the deployment and organised entry into combat of the main forces. In addition, important state facilities must be protected at all times throughout the state. Therefore, covering important state facilities will take the form of their defence only in those areas and directions where the enemy is ahead of us in operational deployment.

The main purpose of covering important state facilities in territorial defence will be to prevent sabotage and reconnaissance groups and other enemy formations from entering the territory of the facilities, to prohibit them from conducting agent and military reconnaissance, and to carry out sabotage and subversive acts.

In this regard, there is a need to make changes in the construction of the protection of especially important objects, which will consist in increasing the density and depth of protection of especially important objects and creating strong mobile reserves. The resulting density and depth of protection of particularly important facilities, as well as the availability of reserves, should ensure the following main tasks: uncovering and eliminating channels for illegal border crossing by persons, movement of weapons, ammunition, explosives; searching for and eliminating sabotage and reconnaissance groups and other anti-state and armed groups. Increasing the density and depth of protection of particularly important facilities should be carried out primarily in areas where hostilities are likely to occur.

The increase in military density, the depth of protection of particularly important facilities and the creation of reserves was and is currently being carried out through the regrouping of forces and means. The analysis of the hostilities shows that this will not always be possible, because with the partial implementation of the Territorial Defence Plan, the protection of the state border, the fulfilment of tasks to combat enemy sabotage and reconnaissance groups, and the suppression of armed provocations will be carried out by formations (units) in areas where no hostilities will be conducted. At the same time, the involvement of mobile forces and units in this task will significantly enhance the protection of particularly important facilities. At the same time, these military formations may be involved in the following main tasks: strengthening the insufficiently covered borders of the state border; assisting the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine in maintaining security measures at the state border; setting up temporary outposts (detachments) on the rear approaches to the state border; taking the necessary measures to strengthen the protection of the deployment points of the National Guard of Ukraine, the Armed Forces of Ukraine, important military facilities and approaches to them.

In this regard, timely receipt of information on violations of the state border in airspace, as well as on enemy air attacks and landings of sabotage and reconnaissance groups, is of particular importance.

The experience of local wars and conflicts, current trends in the development of operational art, and the experience of repelling Russia's armed aggression show that from the very beginning of the war, the emphasis will be on powerful missile, artillery and air strikes using high-precision weapons. The possibility of using chemical and biological weapons cannot be ruled out. As for nuclear weapons, their massive use is unlikely. At the same time, we cannot ignore the possibility of using nuclear weapons in certain cases for intimidation, as well as attempts to carry out acts of nuclear terrorism at critical facilities.

The need to improve the organisation of warnings is also caused by the fact that the level of economic development of the territory of the areas of responsibility and the degree of human impact on the environment is very high. These areas are home to industrial facilities, the destruction of which will create an appropriate radiation and chemical situation. In the event of mass destruction of facilities, units of the security and defence sector may also find themselves in contamination zones.

At the same time, studies show that the National Guard of Ukraine has insignificant capabilities to perform radiation, chemical, biological intelligence and protection activities. These activities are mainly carried out by the Armed Forces of Ukraine and therefore assistance in organising and implementing warning by the Armed Forces of Ukraine is envisaged.

In the following, we will consider the task of searching for and destroying sabotage and reconnaissance groups and other anti-state armed groups. An analysis of the structure and armament of the armies of developed European states, the experience of local wars (conflicts) leads to the conclusion that in the period of preparation for hostilities, we should expect intensification of intelligence activities, mass deployment of sabotage and reconnaissance groups by the enemy to carry out subversive actions. Sabotage and reconnaissance groups will be most actively and deeply deployed in the areas of operations of its main strike groups.

The large spatial scope of territorial defence, the large number of sabotage and reconnaissance groups being thrown in, and the complexity of physical and geographical conditions require the involvement of a large number of forces and means to combat sabotage and reconnaissance groups. To detect sabotage and reconnaissance groups, special search operations will be conducted, the specific feature of which is actions that do not have a pronounced character of armed struggle. In cases of a massive breakthrough of the state border by violators, it may be decided to conduct several operations, which may be carried out simultaneously or sequentially.

At the same time, units and subunits of the security and defence sector may be used to perform the following main tasks: conducting reconnaissance and search operations in areas where agents, sabotage and reconnaissance groups, illegal anti-state formations may be located in order to detect and destroy them; blocking (covering) areas where border violators may be located.

Counter-sabotage is an important part of territorial defence measures. The purpose of counter-sabotage is, firstly, to prevent enemy sabotage and reconnaissance units from affecting troops, important facilities and communications, and thus to ensure conditions for the normal operation of the rear and the population, and secondly, to detect and neutralise special enemy forces and means landed on our territory.

The content of the counter-sabotage struggle will consist of measures and actions aimed at preventing the covert passage of sabotage and reconnaissance groups into our rear; identifying and neutralising those groups that have managed to infiltrate; prohibiting saboteurs from establishing contacts with anti-government elements among our population; protecting and defending important facilities and communications, transported goods, political and military leaders and prominent scientists; maintaining firm public order and security.

The world experience of combating enemy sabotage and reconnaissance formations shows that measures and actions against sabotage include: radar of the airspace to detect enemy special aircraft overflights, the fact of landing of sabotage and reconnaissance groups in our rear; establishing a system of observation posts in areas where saboteurs may land; systematic inspection of areas where it is impossible to establish a system of observation posts to detect the enemy or its traces of landing.

Thus, counter-sabotage struggle in the country's rear is a set of military, operational, regime and other measures and actions aimed at detecting enemy sabotage, reconnaissance and other subversive formations, creating obstacles to their performance of tasks and their destruction.

To carry out measures and actions against sabotage, it is necessary to involve forces and means of various agencies, namely units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, territorial bodies of the Security Service of Ukraine, the National Guard of Ukraine, paramilitary guards of all types, and armed groups of the local population. The role of the National Guard of Ukraine in implementing measures and actions against sabotage is very significant. The most active and important measures and actions to be carried out by the units of the National Guard of Ukraine are those aimed at searching for and eliminating sabotage and reconnaissance groups, conducting military intelligence, protecting and defending important facilities, etc.

## **Conclusions**

The analysis allows us to conclude the following.

1. In the overall system of national security of the state, one of the most important and complex tasks is territorial defence, both on the whole territory and in its individual regions. At the present stage, this issue is of particular importance for Ukraine. This is primarily due to the economic, social and political changes that have occurred in the world and in our country over the past decade, new views on the development and use of forces and means in modern wars and armed conflicts. In the context of a decreasing threat of a global nuclear war, developed countries are increasingly paying attention to the development and adoption of new weapons, improvement of existing ones and search for new forms and methods of armed struggle, including the widespread use of unconventional weapons and sabotage and reconnaissance activities.

2. One of the conditions that ensure the successful conduct of territorial defence is the organisation and maintenance of interaction between the troops, forces and means involved. When organising the interaction of the components of the security and defence sector in territorial defence, it is important to take into account the complexity of its content and structure, significant changes in the quantitative and qualitative composition, combat capabilities of the troops participating in territorial defence, the large spatial scope of its conduct, as well as the qualitative development of command and control systems. All of this greatly complicates the organisation of interaction, its content, planning and methods of practical training.

3. The effective solution of territorial defence tasks requires the involvement of all components of the security and defence sector. The task of repelling attacks on critical facilities requires special attention. The development of methods of armed struggle, command and control systems, the development and improvement of high-precision weapons and the increase in the combat capabilities of troops on this basis inevitably leads to the emergence of new forms and methods of their use. The large spatial scope of territorial defence, the large number of sabotage and reconnaissance groups that are being deployed, and the complexity of physical

and geographical conditions require the deployment of a large number of forces and means to combat sabotage and reconnaissance groups.

Further research will focus on developing mechanisms for the interaction of the components of the security and defence sector of Ukraine in the context of repelling Russia's large-scale armed aggression.

### References

1. Sobko S. S., Punda Yu. V., Muzychenko D. P. (2023). *Terytorialna oborona v perspektyvii modeli oborony Ukrainy* [Territorial defence in the perspective model of defence of Ukraine]. *Nauka i oborona*, vol. 2, pp. 20–27 [in Ukrainian].
2. Lobko M. M. (2018). *Terytorialna oborona Ukrainy yak faktor posylennia oboronozdatnosti derzhavy* [Territorial defence in the perspective model of defence of Ukraine]. *Nauka i oborona*, vol. 2, pp. 20–27 [in Ukrainian].
3. Romanchenko I. S., Frolov V. S., Paliy V. V. (2009). *Shliakhy pidvyshchennia efektyvnosti systemy upravlinnia terytorialnoiu oboronoiu Ukrainy*. [Ways to improve the efficiency of the territorial defence management system of Ukraine]. *Nauka i oborona*, vol. 4, pp. 6–11 [in Ukrainian].
4. *Zakon Ukrainy "Pro osnovy natsionalnoho sprotyvu" № 1702-IX* [The Law of Ukraine about the basis of national resistance activity no. 1702-IX]. (2021, July 16). Retrieved from: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1702-20#Text> (accessed 27 July 2024) [in Ukrainian].
5. *Ukaz Prezidenta Ukrainy "Pro Stratehiu voiennoi bezpeky Ukrainy" № 121/2021* [Decree of the President of Ukraine about Military Security Strategy of Ukraine activity no. 121/2021]. (2021, March 25). Retrieved from: <https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/1212021-37661> (accessed 27 July 2024) [in Ukrainian].

*The article was submitted to the editorial office on 20.06.2024*

**УДК 355.45**

**В. В. Єманов, В. І. Тробюк, С. В. Бєлай**

### **ТЕОРЕТИКО-ОРГАНІЗАЦІЙНІ ЗАСАДИ ВЗАЄМОДІЇ СКЛАДОВИХ СЕКТОРУ БЕЗПЕКИ І ОБОРОНИ ПІД ЧАС ПЛАНУВАННЯ І ЗДІЙСНЕННЯ ЗАХОДІВ ТЕРИТОРІАЛЬНОЇ ОБОРОНИ**

*Доведено актуальність дослідження стосовно вивчення теоретико-організаційних засад взаємодії складових сектору безпеки і оборони під час планування і здійснення заходів територіальної оборони. Установлено, що в загальній системі національної безпеки держави одним із найбільш важливих і складних завдань є територіальна оборона – як на всій території, так і в її окремих регіонах. На сучасному етапі це питання набуває для України особливої значущості. Передусім це зумовлено тими економічними, соціальними й політичними змінами, які сталися у світі й у нашій державі за останнє десятиріччя, новими поглядами на розвиток і застосування сил та засобів у сучасних війнах і збройних конфліктах. В обстановці зниження загрози розв'язання світової ядерної війни розвинені держави дедалі більше уваги приділяють розробленню і прийняттю на озброєння нових засобів ураження, вдосконаленню наявних і пошуку нових форм та способів збройної боротьби, зокрема і з широким застосуванням нетрадиційної зброї і диверсійно-розвідувальних дій.*

*Розкрито зміст підготовки до заходів територіальної оборони. Однією з умов, що забезпечує успішне ведення територіальної оборони, визначено організацію та підтримання взаємодії військ, сил і засобів, що беруть у ній участь. У процесі організації взаємодії складових сектору безпеки і оборони в територіальній обороні важливо насамперед ураховувати складність її змісту і структури, значну зміну в кількісному та якісному складі, бойових можливостях військ, що беруть участь у територіальній обороні, великий просторовий розмах її проведення, а також якісний розвиток*

систем управління. Усе це значно ускладнює організацію взаємодії, її зміст, планування та методи практичного відпрацювання.

Обґрунтовано, що ефективно вирішення завдань територіальної оборони вимагає залучення всіх складових сектору безпеки і оборони. Особливої уваги потребує завдання з відбиття нападу на особливо важливі об'єкти. Розвиток способів збройної боротьби, систем управління, розроблення й удосконалення високоточної зброї і підвищення на цій основі бойових можливостей військ неминуче веде до виникнення нових форм і способів їхнього застосування. Великий просторовий розмах територіальної оборони, значна кількість диверсійно-розвідувальних груп, що закидаються, складність фізико-географічних умов вимагають залучення до боротьби з диверсійно-розвідувальними групами великої кількості сил і засобів.

Подальші наукові дослідження будуть спрямовані на розроблення механізмів взаємодії складових сектору безпеки і оборони України в умовах відсічі широкомасштабної збройної агресії росії.

**Ключові слова:** територіальна оборона, організація взаємодії, сектор безпеки і оборони, органи управління, особливо важливі об'єкти, диверсійно-розвідувальні сили.

**Yemanov Vladyslav** – Doctor of Sciences in Public Administration, Senior Research Officer, First Deputy Head of the National Academy of the National Guard of Ukraine for Educational and Methodological Work  
<https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5055-8852>

**Trobiuk Volodymyr** – Candidate of Military Sciences, Associate Professor, Head of the Educational and Research Center for the Organization of the Educational Process of the National Academy of the National Guard of Ukraine  
<https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3248-2935>

**Bielai Serhii** – Doctor of Sciences in Public Administration, Professor, Deputy Head of the Educational and Research Center for the Organization of the Educational Process – Head of the Scientific and Methodological Department of the National Academy of the National Guard of Ukraine  
<https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0841-9522>