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# RECOMMENDATIONS ON JUSTIFICATION OF PLANS FOR LOCALISATION OF CRISIS (NON-STANDARD) SITUATIONS AT INTERNATIONAL AUTOMOBILE BORDER CROSSING POINTS UNDER MARTIAL LAW

*It is justified and developed recommendations on plans for localisation of crisis (non-standard) situations at international automobile border crossing points of Ukraine under martial law. The specifics of the military aggression against Ukraine, which caused significant destruction of infrastructure, economic losses and humanitarian crisis, which creates new challenges for the border service, have been taken into account.*

*The need to improve the activities of border units through the rational distribution of forces and means is indicated. Various types of threats are given, in particular terrorist and military threats, illegal movement of persons, smuggling of drugs and weapons, as well as illegal movement of goods. Each of these threats requires specific measures by border services to ensure security and effective control.*

*The proposed model of justification of plans for localisation of crisis situations is based on the use of mathematical models to assess probable scenarios of events and determine the most rational options for action. Using these models allows border units to respond quickly to changes in the situation and make informed decisions on the allocation of resources and the use of forces.*

*The methodology described in the research provides the possibility of timely identification of conditions requiring the use of simplified border control, as well as the conditions under which it is necessary to temporarily stop border control. This allows you to adapt control procedures according to specific threats and situations, reducing risks and increasing management efficiency. The results of the study demonstrate that the use of the proposed models and methods makes it possible to develop more effective plans for the localisation of crisis situations that take into account current challenges and threats. They provide coordination between different services and units, which is critical for ensuring security at the border under martial law. Thus, the work makes a significant contribution to the development of the border management system of Ukraine in conditions of increased threat.*

***Keywords:*** *recommendations, martial law, model, methodology, localisation of crisis (non-standard) situations, system of indicators, simplification of border control, temporary suspension of border control.*

**Statement of the problem.** The full-scale russian aggression against Ukraine, which has been going on for the third year in a row, began after a prolonged build-up of enemy troops since November 2021 along Ukraine's border with russia and belarus and the recognition by the russian authorities on 21 February 2022 of terrorist quasi-organisations on the territory of Ukraine – the so-called DPR and LPR – as state entities. Almost simultaneously, the armed forces of the russian federation began to openly deploy additional troops to the occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. In total, the enemy created five groupings of troops (forces) in certain areas, which were involved in the offensive.

For three years now, the enemy has been trying not only to seize Ukrainian territories but also to destroy all life on them through missile and bomb attacks. Russia's military aggression has caused large-scale destruction of productive capital and infrastructure, and has resulted in huge human and humanitarian and social losses. According to the UN International Organisation for Migration, more than 14 million people – almost a third of the population – have left Ukraine in the two years since the start of the full-scale invasion. About 3.7 million people are displaced within the country, and almost 6.5 million are refugees abroad.

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The poverty rate has reached 24 %, and more than 7 million people are living below the poverty line.

According to research conducted by the Kyiv School of Economics, as of January 2024, direct damage to Ukraine's infrastructure caused by the war increased to 155 billion in USD, with the country's housing stock being the most affected. This estimate also takes into account the damage caused to Ukraine by the 6 June 2023 explosion of the Kakhovka hydroelectric power station by the aggressor country. The total economic losses are over 600 billion in USD. The environment was damaged by at least 57 billion in USD.

Thus, the russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 launched one of the largest and most destructive wars in the world since World War II. The cost of damage and recovery needs are already reaching record levels, and the rate of decline in real gross domestic product and industrial production exceeds that of most countries during the wars of the second half of the 20th and early 21st centuries. On the other hand, Ukraine managed to avoid macro-financial destabilisation in 2022–2024 and diversified sources of financing expenditures, which will keep the economy from falling further and positively affect the prospects for post-war recovery.

**Analysis of recent research and publications.** The issues of forming requirements for the structure of a border crossing points (BCP), forming indicators and criteria for assessing the effectiveness of border control (BC), forecasting and selecting rational options for the use of units, developing recommendations to the head of the state border protection body during the aggravation of the military-political situation are investigated in the works of the authors [1–5]. The development of options for the actions of border units, the formation of step-by-step procedures for the management of units and the determination of the main selection criteria for the development of options for the actions of border units are considered in the methodological recommendations [6]. The article [7] analyses the changes made to the legal framework of Ukraine in late February – May 2022 regarding the peculiarities of passing certain categories of persons (including persons liable for military service), vehicles, humanitarian and military aid cargo across the state border of Ukraine under martial law.

At the same time, the issue of improving the activities and finding ways to increase the efficiency of operational and service activities (OSA) at BCPs under martial law by rationally distributing forces and means of border guard units at international automobile border crossing points has not been considered in the known literature.

**The purpose of the article** is to formulate recommendations to the headquarters of the border guard detachment on justification of plans for localisation of crisis (non-standard) situations at international automobile border checkpoints under martial law.

**Summary of the main material.** The above information confirms the logical conclusion that the border with the European Union (EU) and the Republic of Moldova may be subject to the threats listed in Table 1.

In research papers [8, 9] it is proposed a model and methodology that allow combining the main threats identified as a result of analytical studies that may appear at Ukrainian BCPs under martial law, and reasonably it is formulated the most likely options for the development of the situation and, accordingly, scenarios of actions aimed at implementing measures to counter threats.

The use of the proposed mathematical models makes it possible to evaluate the necessary indicators, and the criteria for assessing the situation allow formulating proposals for the rational allocation of forces and means at international crossing points under martial law in the state, which is the basis for making managerial decisions regarding the application of one of the three scenarios for organising operational and service activities (OSA) at BCPs, namely:

1) the BC (border control) procedures at BCPs are unchanged;

2) simplification of border control at BCPs:

– implementation of only certain components of the border control procedure for persons moving through BCPs;

– implementation of only certain components of the border control procedure for vehicles moving through BCPs;

3) temporary suspension of border control at BCPs:

– blocking or attempts to block checkpoints across the state border of Ukraine, armed attack or seizure of checkpoints;

– disarmament or attempts to disarm border patrols at BCPs;

– detection of signs of preparation, commission or attempted commission of terrorist acts (acts) at BCPs;

– man-made or natural emergencies that pose a threat to human life and health, etc.

Table 1 – Analysis of possible developments in the situation on the state border of Ukraine

| No | Type of threat | Possible enemy actions |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | The terrorist and military threat | 1. Conducting russian intelligence and sabotage activities with the help of unmanned aerial vehicles, sabotage and reconnaissance groups, complexes of technical means of intelligence, etc.<br>2. Further blocking the waters of the Black and Azov seas of the russian navy in order to destabilize the military and economic situations in Ukraine. Attempts of armed destruction or seizure of civilian vessels, mining of water areas and fairways are not excluded.<br>3. Destruction of checkpoints by missile and bomb means |
| 2 | The illegal movement of people across the state border (in particular illegal migration) | 1. The increase in the number of attempts of transit illegal migration of foreigners to the EU countries outside checkpoints and at BCPs by road, air and sea transport, in particular with the use of fake, foreign and illegally issued passports.<br>2. Continuation of the destructive policy of the highest military-political leadership of the republic of belarus in relation to Ukraine and neighboring states, in particular, the maintenance of the channels of illegal migration to the EU. The above is facilitated by belarusian border guards and law enforcement officers |
| 3 | The active combat operations in Ukraine | 1. Uncontrolled circulation of weapons, ammunition and explosives will increase. This can lead to an increase in the risk of their illegal movement across the state border and worsening of the crime situation in the border.<br>2. The number of attempts to illegally move through BCPs and outside them by males will increase in order to avoid mobilization |
| 4 | Smuggling of synthetic substances | 1. Smuggling of synthetic drugs and medicines to Ukraine at crossing points on the border with the EU countries and transit through Moldova, by hiding in the structural elements of transport, as well as in the sending by post of "migrant workers" and "humanitarian cargoes".<br>2. Attempts to smuggle into the EU and Moldova drug substances of plant origin in small batches.<br>3. Restoration (in case of full unblocking of the Black Sea for civilian shipping) of transit channels of heavy drugs to the EU countries through BCPs for sea traffic |
| 5 | The illegal movements of goods | 1. To Ukraine – consumer goods, according to the scheme of falsification of goods and accompanying documents, the use of humanitarian cargoes, especially at the border with the EU countries.<br>2. Both in Ukraine and abroad – cultural treasures, antiques, funds, etc. at BCPs by hiding in the structural elements of transport.<br>3. From Ukraine on the border with EU countries – cigarettes, weapons, ammunition and drug substances, in particular with the use of small aircraft |
| 6 | Other | The emergence of new (atypical) threats and risks associated with the use of advanced technologies and other uncontrolled factors is not excluded |

As for the content of the above-mentioned scenarios, it is important for their practical implementation to be able to identify the conditions for their application in a timely manner. Thus, if the forecasted state of the situation at a particular BCP reveals the need for simplified border control, the relevant branch of measures is developed using the BC indicators at the BCP for conditions of high intensity of vehicle traffic with the use of a reduced inspection regime. The analysis of the organisation of the checkpoints in the first period of the war between Ukraine and russia in 2022 revealed that the servicemen of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine implemented only certain control measures during the mass departure of women with children.

The research proposes the use of models of organisation of simplified BC in international road transport regulations under martial law. This model is based on the use of databases of typical offenders who manifest their unlawful intentions and on the results of the analysis of typical information signs of offences.

The model implements the possibility of evaluating the available features by the threshold criterion. If the available set of features is insufficient to make decisions on the organisation of simplified control, an additional selection of information features is carried out within the allotted time. When the conditions of the criterion are not met, the degree of compliance of the object of attention with the data on the potential offender is determined, followed by an assessment of the compliance with the conditions of the criterion of the degree of compliance with the lower limit value of the indicator of compliance with the typical image of the offender.

A characteristic feature of the model is that, if the existing staff is unable to implement a set of measures (to assess all information features within the allotted time), proposals are made to strengthen them with technical means or additional involvement of specialists with relevant skills.

If there is a need to organise a simplified BC for vehicles, another set of measures-tasks is carried out. For this set of measures, we offer the use of a model for the implementation of individual components of the BC procedures for vehicles moving through BCPs. This model is based on determining the degree of compliance of external information signs with typical signs of the placement of illegal objects in a vehicle.

In addition to the above, it is now possible to use the data entered into the existing database of information on the location of illegal objects in vehicles, cargo, baggage and their information features. If the conditions of the relevant criterion are met, measures are taken to additionally obtain information about the object of control. In other respects, the degree of compliance of the object with the data on the potential offender is determined or the condition under which the vehicle is subject to an in-depth inspection is met. Otherwise, if there is time, the control measures are continued for further inspection to identify possible information signs of an offence. Upon completion of the in-depth control, the available information signs are assessed against the upper limit of the criterion and appropriate decisions are made regarding the object of control.

If the result of the situation analysis gives grounds to assert that the development of events at a particular checkpoint requires a temporary suspension of border control at the BCP, the model uses the function of identifying the reasons for such a decision.

For example, provided that the reason is an armed blockade of the BCP, or an armed attack on or seizure of the BCP, the model of actions of military personnel during an armed blockade of the BCP, an armed attack or an attempt to disarm border patrols at the BCP is implemented.

The input data for the implementation of this model are the calculated data obtained by using the well-known model of the duel nature of combat operations and taking into account the full list of possible options for the development of combat at the BCP.

The model made it possible to determine the effectiveness of military personnel and identify the timely need for additional reserves (second stage).

Otherwise, indicators of the rational distribution of forces and means of border guard units at international automobile BCPs under martial law are calculated and an appropriate decision to determine the group of counteraction tasks is made.

When the above-mentioned conditions of the methodology are not met, an assessment is made as to whether the condition of feasibility of the scenario is met, for example, disarmament or attempted disarmament of border patrols at BCPs. Under this scenario, the characteristics of the scenario are analysed and the requirements for countermeasures are formed and calculated.

If the next condition is not met, the compliance of the information received on the conditions with the criterion of the possibility of committing or attempting to commit terrorist acts (actions) at the BCP is assessed.

If the conditions are not met, it is necessary to assess and enter data on the signs of a possible occurrence of a man-made or natural emergency that pose a threat to the life and health of people at BCPs.

In this case, as in the previous one, the quality of the available information is assessed, followed by the determination of the needs for forces and means to implement measures to counter (neutralise) the threats under consideration. The degree of sufficiency of forces and means is assessed (based on the guarantee of timely implementation of the list of established regulatory actions).

Due to the disclosed options of the methodology's algorithm, all of them are based on the results of forecasting threats that can be implemented at international automobile border crossing points under martial law. This block of analytical measures reproduces the actions of the headquarters to calculate forces and means in accordance with the predicted threats (branches of action) of the algorithm, i.e., form the values of indicators of the rational distribution of forces and means of border units at international automobile border crossing points under martial law with subsequent decision-making.

At the same time, it should be noted that after the decision is made, the border guard unit continues to analyse the situation with subsequent updates and implements specific steps of the methodology algorithm.

Thus, the considered model and methodology make it possible to carry out relevant calculations to substantiate decisions on appropriate measures in cases of forecasting possible options for illegal actions at BCPs, namely:

– hostage-taking at the BCP or in a vehicle, seizure of a vehicle;

– attempted armed breakthrough across the state border at the BCP (a vehicle with terrorists and hostages approaching at the BCP);

– detection of weapons (ammunition) in a vehicle, under clothing or in personal belongings;

– detection of explosives in a vehicle, under clothing or in personal belongings;

– detection of narcotic (psychotropic) substances in a vehicle, under clothing or in personal belongings;

– mass disorder or blocking of the border crossing points;

– mass (group) crossing of the state border at the BCP;

– an attempt to break through the BCP;

– an attempt to transfer items and materials to a vehicle outside of customs control or to overload items (materials);

– identification of persons involved in criminal (terrorist) organisations;

– detection of a person in the passenger flow in respect of whom an order is being executed by authorised state bodies (who is banned from entering Ukraine);

– detection of chemicals that fall into the category of toxic and biological substances in a vehicle, under a person's clothes or in personal belongings during control;

– detection (detention) of large quantities of smuggled goods, including precious materials and products made from them, and cultural property;

– threatening with a weapon at the BCP by a person who is crossing the state border;

– detection of signs of particularly dangerous infectious diseases in people who are crossing the state border;

– detection of radioactive substances in a vehicle, under a person's clothing or in personal belongings during the control of radioactive substances;

– detection of a person with another person's passport, a forged passport or an invalid passport;

– detection of a person without documents (hiding in a vehicle);

– detection of a person without documents (deliberately avoiding border control bypassing border patrols);

– failure to comply with the legal requirements of the border guard (resistance to the border guard).

Timely detection of options for illegal actions at BCPs allows us to further develop algorithms for the actions of the relevant units.

For example, during an attempted armed breakthrough across the state border at the BCP (approaching the BCP by a vehicle with terrorists and hostages) [10] of the Border Guard Service department (border guard inspectors section), the relevant types of units perform the following tasks.

*Shift Leader at the border crossing point (SLBCP)*

1. The corresponding signal is given by the border guard unit that detected the attempted breach. If available, the "howler" "S" (signal) + 0.02 is used.
2. Reports on command.
3. Informs the shift leader of the border patrols of the neighbouring side.
4. Informs the senior customs officer.
5. Sets additional tasks for border patrols.
6. The barrier guard stops vehicles from entering the BCP; the "verification of documents" and "vehicle inspection" units stop the registration of people and vehicles.
7. Together with the regular forces, accompanies the offender to the premises for the interview and execution of procedural documents.
8. Gives the command to the border patrols to resume the movement of vehicles at the BCP.
9. Prepares the necessary procedural documents in relation to the driver of the vehicle: (explanation of the offender, report of the serviceman, report on an administrative offence under Art. 185-10 or Art. 202 of the Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offenses, report of administrative detention (if necessary), report of personal search and search of belongings (if necessary), cover letter to the court, cover page of the administrative file, internal description of the administrative file, copy of the identity document, resolution on the case of an administrative offence for which liability is provided for under the CAO.
10. Clarifies additional tasks for senior officers.

*Verification of documents unit*

1. Receives a signal from the SLBCP.
2. Temporarily suspends passport control.
3. Increases surveillance of vehicles and individuals.
4. According to information from the SLBCP resumes the traffic.

*Vehicle inspection unit*

1. Receives a signal from the SLBCP.
2. Temporarily stops the inspection of vehicles.
3. Increases surveillance of the border point territory, vehicles and persons.
4. According to information from the SLBCP resumes the traffic.

*Barrier guard*

1. It receives a signal from the SLBCP.
2. Acts on a signal (for example, "Barrier"), namely: stops the launch and release of vehicles, activates the means for forced stopping of vehicles and blockers.
3. Reports on the execution of the Barrier signal.
4. Increases surveillance of vehicle arrivals, especially when leaving the BCP.
5. According to information from the SLBCP resumes the traffic.

*The duty forces*

1. Receive the "Barrier" signal.
2. Move to the place of detention of the vehicle and block the vehicle with a police car.
3. The driver of the vehicle is detained by force, and special means (handcuffs) are used.
4. The driver's ignition key is removed and the vehicle's wheels are locked.
5. Under the instruction of the SLBCP, they guard the vehicle and the driver (passengers).

As for the reserve, the queue of Reserve I of the border guard inspection section is put in readiness for action no later than "S" + 00:15 and is moved to the BCP.

*Additional tasks for senior officers of service order groups:*

1) surveillance – to monitor the situation at and around the BCP;

2) film and photo documentation – to document illegal actions;

3) blocking – to block the location of the vehicle, detain offenders and prevent further movement of the vehicle;

4) maintaining public order – to maintain public order in the area of vehicle detention and provide practical assistance to the blocking group.

The Reserve II is put on alert at "S" + 02:30. At "S" + 03:00, it arrives at the scene and surrounds the perimeter of the BCP.

As a result of the material discussed above, the article reveals the quintessence of the relevant model and methodology, their correlation with the existing conditions of service of border patrols in international Border Guard Service and the results of the analysis of possible scenarios of events in Border Guard Service under martial law in Ukraine. It also considers the possibility of practical implementation of the developed model and methodology on the basis of the disclosed scenarios of possible events that require certain operational and service activity measures. The considered options for implementing the model and methodology make it possible, in combination and with their adequate use, to apply them as a methodological basis for proposals for making decisions on the rational allocation of forces and means of the BCP to perform specific tasks under martial law.

## Conclusion

The use of the proposed models and methodology allows the headquarters of border guard detachments to develop plans for localising crisis (non-standard) situations in the areas of responsibility of the state border guard units and to ensure timely response of the management bodies and state border guard units to the occurrence of crisis (non-standard) situations in the areas of responsibility of border guard units.

In addition, the declared plans allow for implementation and coordination:

– organising cooperation with the structural units of the National Police, the Security Service of Ukraine in the region, the National Guard of Ukraine and customs units on localising crisis (non-standard) situations in the areas of responsibility of the border guard units of the border guard detachment;

– strengthening operational, regime and preventive measures in case of aggravation of the situation, possible emergence of crisis (non-standard) situations at the state border of Ukraine in cooperation with the structural units of the Security Service of Ukraine, the National Police, the National Guard, etc;

– implementation of coordinated practical measures to localise non-standard (crisis) situations with the involvement of interacting departments and bodies.

Taking into account the specifics of the area, the projected situation and current threats in terms of localising crisis (non-standard) situations in the areas of responsibility of each of the subordinate units of the State Border Guard, further research will make it possible to determine the possible nature of crisis (non-standard) situations and actions of violators of Ukrainian legislation.

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## РЕКОМЕНДАЦІЇ ЩОДО ОБҐРУНТУВАННЯ ПЛАНІВ ЛОКАЛІЗАЦІЇ КРИЗОВИХ (НЕСТАНДАРТНИХ) СИТУАЦІЙ У МІЖНАРОДНИХ ПУНКТАХ ПРОПУСКУ ДЛЯ АВТОМОБІЛЬНОГО СПОЛУЧЕННЯ В УМОВАХ ВОЄННОГО СТАНУ

*Обґрунтовано й розроблено рекомендації щодо планів локалізації кризових (нестандартних) ситуацій у міжнародних пунктах пропуску автомобільного сполучення України в умовах воєнного стану. Ураховано специфіку воєнної агресії проти України, яка спричинила значні руйнування інфраструктури, економічні втрати та гуманітарну кризу, що створює нові виклики для прикордонної служби.*

*Указано на необхідність удосконалення діяльності прикордонних підрозділів шляхом раціонального розподілу сил і засобів. Наведено різні типи загроз, зокрема терористичні й воєнні загрози, нелегальне переміщення осіб, контрабанда наркотиків і зброї, а також незаконне переміщення товарів. Кожна із загроз потребує від прикордонних служб специфічних заходів для забезпечення безпеки та ефективного контролю.*

*Запропонована модель обґрунтування планів локалізації кризових ситуацій засновується на використанні математичних моделей для оцінювання ймовірних сценаріїв розвитку подій і визначення найраціональніших варіантів дій. Застосування цих моделей дає змогу прикордонним підрозділам оперативно реагувати на зміни ситуації та приймати обґрунтовані рішення щодо розподілу ресурсів і застосування сил.*

*Описана методика забезпечує можливість своєчасного виявлення умов, що потребують застосування спрощеного прикордонного контролю, а також умов, за яких необхідно тимчасово припинити прикордонний контроль. Це дає змогу адаптувати процедури контролю відповідно до конкретних загроз і ситуацій, зменшуючи ризики й підвищуючи ефективність управління. Результати дослідження демонструють, що застосування запропонованих моделей і методик уможливлює розроблення більш ефективних планів локалізації кризових ситуацій з огляду на поточні виклики й загрози. Вони забезпечують координацію дій між різними службами і підрозділами, що критично важливо для забезпечення безпеки на кордоні в умовах воєнного стану. Отже, проведене дослідження сприяє розвитку системи управління кордонами України в умовах підвищеної загрози.*

***Ключові слова:*** *рекомендації, воєнний стан, модель, методика, локалізація кризових (нестандартних) ситуацій, система показників, спрощення прикордонного контролю, тимчасове припинення здійснення прикордонного контролю.*

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