



Yu. Yurchak



V. Zhuravel



L. Balahur

SOME ISSUES OF THE SPECIFIC ISSUES OF THE INFORMATIONAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL COUNTERMEASURE OF PROPAGANDA DIRECTED AT THE PERSONAL COMPOSITION

The specifics and methods of informational and psychological propaganda conducted among the enemy troops and population during the First World War by the Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy) and the Entente (Great Britain, France, the USA, Russia) were studied.

The strategies and methods of this propaganda are analyzed, in particular, the use of mass media to influence the morale of military and civilians. The evaluation of the effectiveness of these measures was also carried out and a contribution was made to the understanding of propaganda as a means of information warfare in the context of military strategies. The need to improve the national security system was emphasized.

Keywords: *hybrid war, national security, State Border Service of Ukraine, armed aggression, informational component of war, security of the state border, informational and psychological propaganda.*

Statement of the problem. In modern conditions, the role and importance of the information factor in the life of our country is growing. The information environment is capable of both speeding up and slowing down the development of all spheres of social life, in particular processes related to the security of the state border.

Since the beginning of Russian aggression, threats to the national security of Ukraine have become one of the most serious problems, and in the context of information security as well. Significant changes took place already in 2014, and with the beginning of a full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation on February 24, 2022, this problem has become even more important for the security of the state border and the overall defense capability of the country.

The task of the State Border Service of Ukraine is to ensure the integrity of the state border and protect the sovereign rights of Ukraine in the adjacent zone, including the maritime economic zone. During the military invasion of the aggressor country, the problem of guarding and protecting the state border arises in the conditions of a complex armed conflict, which at the initial stage took on the character of a hybrid war in the East and South of Ukraine. Threats to the national security, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country are caused by the aggressive actions of the aggressor country, which seeks to annex the territory of Ukraine. In the course of hostilities and armed conflict, a significant part of the border infrastructure, equipment and weapons was damaged or captured.

In view of this, it is particularly important to find ways to ensure the performance of the functions of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, to identify and overcome problems in the field of protection of national interests at the state border, as well as the introduction of modern scientific approaches. Today, these tasks are urgent, since the effective and well-secured work of the State Border Service of Ukraine is extremely important for the protection of the country's national interests.

The problem of researching the aspects of hybrid war became relevant after the invasion of the Russian Federation into Ukraine in 2014. Hybrid war is a modern form of military activity that uses a combination of military, political, economic, social, informational and other means to achieve military and political goals. This is a new approach to warfare. Hybrid war differs from traditional war, when only military force is involved, in that it takes place in different directions, in particular in the information space.

Hybrid warfare is becoming increasingly common and poses a threat to international security. Opposing it requires the development of new strategies and methods of protection. In general, hybrid warfare remains one of the least studied forms of warfare.

In this context, it is worth mentioning the information and psychological propaganda among the troops

and civilian population of the enemy, which was resorted to during the First World War by the Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy) and the Entente (Great Britain, France, the USA, Russia). We focus our attention on the study of propaganda strategies and methods, information dissemination tactics, psychological impact on the enemy's troops and civilian population, as well as the effectiveness of these efforts in relation to military and political goals. We study the use of various mass media, in particular radio, the press, leaflets, and also analyze the influence of propaganda on the morale of servicemen and the population, on the course of the war in general.

Analysis of recent research and publications. Modern research and publications study the impact of hybrid warfare on the planning and conduct of military operations, on changes in policy, strategy and tactics, as well as the principles and practices of the use of military force. It turns out that hybrid warfare changes the tactics and principles of military planning.

The specifics of the war unleashed by Russia in terms of its methods of conduct differ from traditional wars that took place in the 20th–21st centuries. The extreme urgency of this problem explains the significant interest of politicians, journalists, researchers, experts and scientists.

The problem of hybrid warfare was studied by D. Kupriienko, A. Bratko, V. Torichnyi, T. Biletska, Yu. Ivashkov and other scientists [2–5].

V. Demskyi, V. Zhuravel and S. Burbela considered the issue of counteracting the negative informational and psychological influence on the personnel of the state border protection agency in the context of information warfare. They studied the negative informational and psychological impact, took into account the influence of society on the individual [3, 6].

The historical tour conducted during the First World War made it possible to investigate the peculiarities of conducting informational and psychological propaganda by the Triple Alliance and the Entente among the armed forces and the civilian population of the enemy, to analyze the propaganda strategies and methods used by the participants of the warring parties.

The purpose of the article is to reveal the specifics of conducting information and psychological propaganda during the First World War by the Triple Alliance and the Entente among enemy troops and civilians, a detailed analysis and comparison of the propaganda campaigns conducted by both sides in order to identify their features, tactics and effectiveness. The main focus is on researching the methods of psychological influence on military personnel and the civilian population of the enemy, as well as evaluating the impact of these efforts on the course of the war and the morale of the parties involved.

Summary of the main material. At the initial stage of the First World War (1914–1918), the governments of the countries that participated in it, except for Germany, came to the conclusion of the need to create special structures to carry out propaganda among the enemy's troops and population, as well as to influence public opinion in neutral countries. Since then, similar bodies have been introduced in all the leading countries of the world, and in Germany they were also created after 1918 [7].

In those times, when radio had not yet become a universal means of mass communication, and sound systems were very simple and their effectiveness was little different from ordinary loudspeakers, propaganda and psychological influence was mainly carried out with the help of printed products. Postcards, newspapers, pamphlets, POW letters, posters, fake ration cards, and other forms of printed propaganda became the most common means of communication and influence. At first, these were letters from the English camps of German prisoners of war to their relatives. Thanks to the invention of offset printing in England, copies of such letters were created very carefully, taking into account such details as the color of the ink, which had to match the original. Often, German soldiers perceived them as originals and sent them by mail to their relatives. The content of the letters remained unchanged and had no additional comments. The essence of the propaganda effect was that the letters were selected, which spoke about the good treatment of prisoners [8].

Informational and psychological propaganda became a key tool for conducting hostilities for both sides of the conflict: the Triple Alliance and the Entente. Propaganda campaigns were directed at both military personnel and the civilian population of the enemy in order to undermine their morale and support their own psychological fighting capacity.

The member countries of the Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy) aimed their propaganda at the home front, campaigning among their own military and civilian populations to increase patriotism and moral support for the war effort. Flyers, posters, and literature were distributed to support the soldiers at the front and rally public opinion.

France, Great Britain, Russia and the United States directed their propaganda at the enemy, trying to lower his morale and support for military operations. The Entente resorted to such means of propaganda as mass media (newspapers, movies), leaflets, and also used psychological techniques to demoralize enemy forces.

Propaganda affected the morale of military personnel, strengthening the fighting spirit in their own ranks and disorienting the enemy forces.

Propaganda campaigns played an important role in the formation of a patriotic mood among the civilian population and supported the idea of the correctness of military actions.

Soldiers were fascinated by illustrated postcards. Some of them contained profound criticisms of social conditions and the conduct of the war, including the German Kaiser, Prussian Junkers, and the military bureaucracy. German prisoners of war were allowed to read materials forbidden at home: letters from K. Liebknecht, socialist newspapers and other publications. This was done in order to influence the morale of the German population: postcards were sent home to prisoners. Growing confidence in British propaganda contributed to a consistent decrease in hostility among enemy soldiers. In some parts of the Anglo-German front, German soldiers no longer had the desire to fight to the last, but surrendered.

American propaganda focused on the problem of food for German prisoners of war as a way to undermine sentiment in Germany itself, where hardship was also felt. The postcard had the appearance of a German field postcard and contained an address for contacting relatives. The instructions directed this postcard of a captured POW to the Americans for further sending to relatives to reassure them about his condition. It usually read: "They feed us well: they give us beef, white bread, potatoes, beans and peas, cream, coffee, milk, butter, tobacco and other things."

In September 1918, the British started publishing local "fake" newspapers along with leaflets. A portrait of the Kaiser appeared on their cover and the price was indicated – 10 pfennigs. These newspapers were an effective means of influencing the German soldiers, who read anything to pass the time. The circulation of such newspapers was from 250 to 500 thousand copies every week. Postcards were also produced in large quantities: in October 1918 alone, 5 million 360 thousand postcards were sent out in Great Britain [9].

At the beginning, propaganda materials were distributed by a specially created aviation unit. In 1918, a special campaign projectile was developed and tested in England [10]. From the first days of the war, the British became leaders in propaganda against the enemy and maintained this leadership until the very end of the conflict. Although mistakes were not made, not all efforts were successful, but useful experience was gained. As a result, English propaganda almost always achieved its goals.

After the end of the war, the German general E. Ludendorff praised the effectiveness of British propaganda in the context of its influence on compatriots. The Germans were so thoroughly and widely influenced by enemy propaganda that eventually many people lost the ability to distinguish between what was enemy propaganda and what was their own beliefs. They no longer wanted to fight to the last drop of blood, to give their lives for their homeland.

According to British experts, successful propaganda required its recognition as a state initiative. This meant that the Ministry of Information was embedded in the state apparatus and maintained close contact with the Prime Minister, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the military structures.

In Great Britain, it was understood that the success of propaganda depends to a large extent on its widespread use, and no expense was spared for it, hoping for a huge return. The Ministry of Information managed to build and conduct propaganda in such a way that the main goal – to attract the enemy to its side – remained hidden from the target audiences. The best propaganda is that which is not felt by the object of influence and is carried out imperceptibly for him.

In 1922, the 12th volume of the Encyclopedia Britannica stated the key principles of English propaganda. Yes, the truth only makes sense when it is relevant. The whole truth can be redundant and often lead to mistakes. It is better to use the truth only partially. Much of the propaganda work must be done inconspicuously, as any obvious propaganda arouses suspicion and reduces its effectiveness.

Tactical approaches to propaganda were formulated as follows:

- it is necessary to apply influence methods that attract the attention of specific population groups;
- such influence methods should be chosen that reduce unwanted ideas that arise in society due to ignoring events;
- it is important to use methods of influence that have a low probability of opposing the achievement of propaganda goals.

Therefore, it is necessary to get rid of contradictions in advertising contexts aimed at the same group of people [11].

According to these principles, the successful selection of materials for propaganda involves not only an accurate assessment of the expected results of their distribution, but also an analysis of possible reactions and countermeasures.

One of the most effective techniques for a propagandist is to be able to empathize with those he or she is trying to influence and to carefully analyze different approaches to getting their attention. Thus, the advocacy team must be composed of people who have a deep understanding of the target populations they will be working with.

During the First World War, there was a significant development in both theory and practice of propaganda. Propaganda mechanisms of the warring states skillfully used techniques of disinformation, which was presented as true information, actively used psychological methods, involved leading journalists, linguists and artists, spending considerable money on it. Instead of limiting themselves to simple attacks on the military leadership, already in the second year of the war, the propagandists expanded the topic and began to actively incite internal conflicts in the enemy ranks, psychologically influence the enemy troops, and cultivate disorientation among the civilian population.

Propaganda bodies of the Entente countries actively cooperated to coordinate their efforts in the main directions. Ideas were spread about the hopelessness of the military and political situation of Germany and Austria-Hungary, the population and armies of these countries were convinced of the reliability and strength of the Entente countries, and propaganda was also conducted regarding captivity.

The All-Allied Conference on Propaganda in London in August 1918 – the first international forum on the theory of propaganda aimed at the enemy's troops and population. This conference summed up the activities of the propaganda bodies, summarized the accumulated experience and formulated recommendations for the coordination of propaganda among the Allies.

During the war, the propaganda of the Entente countries was subordinated to a single supreme command. A special headquarters was created to organize the influence on the enemy's troops and population, including various national sections.

After the end of the First World War, the leaders of the armies of the leading world powers showed an increased interest in political experience in the field of propaganda. His analysis and generalization was carried out mainly so that the propaganda mechanisms of the armies could fully assess the mistakes they and their opponents made [7].

The German general P. Warburton expressed the idea that the main goal of modern war is not only the destruction of the enemy's armed forces, as was previously believed, but the demoralization of the entire population of the enemy country to such a level that it forces its government to conclude a peace treaty. A clash of armed forces is only one of the possible ways to achieve this strategic goal.

Many Western sociologists and military specialists supported this idea, but in practice little was done to implement it. Most of the political leaders of the world's leading states before the war with Hitler's Germany believed that a simple generalization of the experience of the previous war would be sufficient for successful propaganda in future conflicts [12].

Therefore, the First World War gave a powerful impetus to the development of propaganda as a means of achieving a military goal, a special type of weapon that actually helps the army to carry out combat tasks.

During the First World War, propaganda against the enemy's troops and population proved to be one of the key strategic tools thanks to powerful efforts. This objective process was strengthened by the significant creation of the latest polygraphic machines, which made it possible to distribute postcards en masse, the use of accessible and cheap means of delivery of printed products, as well as the growth of literacy among the population of many countries – participants in the conflict. During the war, special bodies and organizations were created, which were responsible for carrying out propaganda activities among the enemy's troops and civilian population.

The main topics for information-propaganda materials were the following: demonstration of one's own strength to intimidate the enemy, often using psychological techniques; emphasizing the justice of military actions on their part and accusing the enemy of unjust, aggressive behavior; pushing for aggravation of internal contradictions in the enemy's camp, in particular national, racial, property, religious and legal ones; discrediting the enemy's political and military leadership; promoting the idea of the benefits of captivity.

Oral propaganda also developed, in particular with the help of simple technical means. The first steps in this direction were made by radio propaganda on a limited scale. A complete set of technical means for the

distribution of information and propaganda materials appeared: balloons, aerial bombs, aviation containers, propaganda shells, propaganda mines, propaganda grenades.

During the First World War, the main theoretical principles of propaganda were formulated.

Effective propaganda of influence on the enemy's troops and population must meet an important condition: it must be carried out by state bodies. In addition, in each case of using propaganda, clear and specific goals and objectives should be defined. In the case of coalition operations, where cooperation is needed in the field of propaganda against the enemy's troops and population, for better coordination of efforts, propaganda should be managed by a joint command.

The effectiveness of propaganda largely depends on how widely it is applied. Therefore, it is important to use all possible forms and methods from its arsenal, as well as to allocate the necessary material and technical resources. Propaganda must be accessible to the masses: use of expressions and expressions and appropriate dialects common in the territories to which the propaganda is directed.

Propaganda should be used so that its target does not realize that the informational document is specifically directed at him. The most effective propaganda is when the object of influence does not feel that it is being influenced.

People often tend to perceive what corresponds to their desires. In military propaganda aimed at the enemy's troops and population, it is necessary to take into account this feature of human nature and create informational materials in accordance with such needs and interests.

Control over the transmission of information, monitoring of the distribution of various data, censorship and the ban on information have a negative impact on society and cause general dissatisfaction. People who are not fully informed are always eager to learn more, making them easy targets for propagandists.

Authority figures in certain population groups or in the armed forces are invulnerable to discredit. It is important to be especially careful when carrying out propaganda aimed at condemning crowned persons, leaders of parties and movements.

During the First World War, it was possible to solve the significant problem of informational and psychological confrontation not only at the general level of the war, but also in specific combat operations due to the effective use of propaganda tools.

Conclusions

The study found that the effectiveness of information and psychological propaganda was due to its ability to adapt to changing conditions and audience needs, as well as the use of innovative methods and mass media. Further study of propaganda as a tool of war and its impact on modern conflicts is considered extremely important.

An analysis of the propaganda campaigns of both warring camps during the First World War showed that the effectiveness of these measures lay in their ability to evoke an emotional reaction and influence the psychological state of the opponents. During military conflicts, such influence is critical for maintaining morale and demoralizing the enemy, which can be decisive for the course of the war and its outcome.

Prospects for further research in this direction can be seen in the study of the specifics of informational and psychological propaganda used by the countries of the nazi bloc and the communist ussr among the troops and population of the enemy during the Second World War.

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Ю. М. Юрчак, В. Г. Журавель, Л. О. Балагур

ДЕЯКІ ПИТАННЯ СПЕЦИФІКИ ІНФОРМАЦІЙНО-ПСИХОЛОГІЧНОЇ ПРОТИДІЇ ПРОПАГАНДИ, СПРЯМОВАНИЙ НА ОСОБОВИЙ СКЛАД

Досліджено специфіку й методи інформаційно-психологічної пропаганди, що велася серед військ і населення противника під час Першої світової війни Троїтним союзом (Німеччина, Австро-Угорщина, Італія) та Антантою (Велика Британія, Франція, США, росія). Проаналізовано стратегії і методи цієї пропаганди, зокрема застосування засобів масової інформації задля впливу на моральний стан військових та цивільних осіб. Здійснено також оцінювання ефективності цих заходів і зроблено внесок у розуміння пропаганди як засобу інформаційного ведення війни в контексті військових стратегій. Наголошено на необхідності вдосконалення системи забезпечення національної безпеки.

Розглянуто різні підходи до визначення гібридної війни, зокрема в контексті України та особливостей діяльності Державної прикордонної служби. Проаналізовано сутність цього поняття та загальні принципи щодо захисту національних інтересів на державному кордоні.

Досліджено вплив інформаційно-психологічної пропаганди на військові стратегії часів Першої

світової війни: моральний дух, поведінку військ і мирного населення. Так, успішність інформаційно-психологічної пропаганди залежить від її здатності пристосовуватися до умов, що змінюються, від перебігу її потреб аудиторії, а також від застосування інноваційних методів і засобів масової інформації. Дослідження заохочує подальше вивчення пропаганди як інструменту у війні та її впливу на сучасні конфлікти.

Ключові слова: *гібридна війна, національна безпека, Державна прикордонна служба України, збройна агресія, інформаційна складова війни, безпека державного кордону, інформаційно-психологічна пропаганда.*

YURCHAK Yurii – Lecturer of the Department of Combined Military Disciplines of the Bohdan Khmelnytskyi National Academy of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine
<https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9506-3228>

ZHURAVEL Vitalii – Candidate of Military Sciences, Associate Professor, Head of the Department of Combined Military Disciplines of the Bohdan Khmelnytskyi National Academy of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine
<https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4126-5414>

BALAHUR Lesia – Candidate of Pedagogical Sciences, Associate Professor of the Department of Combined Military Disciplines of the Bohdan Khmelnytskyi National Academy of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine
<https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1137-1670>