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THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL JUSTIFICATION OF THE CONCEPT OF POST-CONVENTIONAL WAR AS A NEW FORM OF ARMED CONFLICTS NOWADAYS

The evolution of the forms of armed conflicts and their main features are surveyed. The main features of post-conventional war as a new form of armed conflicts and its differences from armed conflicts of previous types: non-conventional, conventional and hybrid are determined. The need for a theoretical understanding of the post-conventional war experience, the development of effective concepts for responding to the systemic challenges it creates, is substantiated.

Keywords: *armed conflict, post-conventional war, conventional war, hybrid war.*

Statement of the problem. The full-scale aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine led to the emergence of a new type of war – post-conventional. Its main features and differences from wars of previous types (unconventional, conventional, hybrid) need to be defined and determined.

A scientific and philosophical understanding of the post-conventional war experience and the development of effective concepts for responding to the systemic challenges it creates is necessary.

Analysis of recent research and publications. Such a phenomenon as armed conflict and its largest form – war, has accompanied humanity throughout its history. Therefore, it is quite natural that since ancient times this phenomenon has become a subject of study. Philosophical understanding of various aspects of war is found in works of such authors as Sun Tzu, K. Clausewitz, A. Meehan, F. Mehring, F. Fukuyama, S. Huntington, etc. [1, 2, 3]. The issues of scientific understanding of war were considered in the studies of M. Saxonskyi, O. Jomini, G. Delbrück, B. Liddel Hart, M. van Creveld, E. Mack, D. Boyd, S. Metz, D. Johnson, V. Zaluzhnyi, A. Datsiuk, etc. [3, 4, 5]. Some works analyzed only certain aspects of the scientific understanding of the essence of post-conventional war, lacking their comprehensive consideration and study of the system challenges that it creates.

The analysis of these and other works has shown the following:

- insufficient attention is paid to the peculiarities of the transformation of war as a systemic phenomenon;
- existing theoretical views on the typology of modern wars do not correspond to the real state of affairs that has developed as a result of the full-scale aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine.

Some certain aspects of this problem have been highlighted in scientific works [5, 6]. However, the need for its in-depth development is determined by the practical requests and needs of the National Guard of Ukraine as a component of the defense forces of our state.

A contradiction arises: on the one hand, the need to use scientifically based views on the modern military conflict (post-conventional war) and the systemic challenges it creates, and on the other hand, the impossibility of doing so at the current level of its study.

The relevance of the problem, insufficient theoretical study and its practical development have led to the need to substantiate the theoretical understanding of the experience of post-conventional war, to develop effective concepts for responding to the challenges it creates.

The purpose of the article is to scientifically understand the paradigm of post-conventional war as a new form of armed conflict in modern times, and to develop effective concepts for responding to the challenges it creates.

Summery of the main material. The issue of typification and periodization of armed conflicts in the history of mankind has always been in the focus of attention of philosophers, scientists, military theorists and practitioners. Since a thorough scientific and philosophical analysis of any phenomenon primarily clarifies its etymology and morphology, we can assert that military historiography is an undoubtedly important

scientific discipline, which, through the analysis of the scientific heritage, determines the main trends in the development of the phenomenon of war, which is studied by military historical science. Taking into account these trends and their impact on the development of such a phenomenon as war allows theorists to proceed to synthesis, not only ascertaining the actual changes that occur in the practice of conducting armed conflicts, but also creating new concepts that determine reality [7, 8].

In our opinion, the most appropriate typification concept of armed conflicts was proposed by M. van Creveld. It defines wars as unconventional, conventional and hybrid [1, 5]. Post-conventional war is seen as the next stage of development – a type of armed conflict that allows the aggressor state to bypass the restrictions imposed on the use of armed force by previous forms of warfare [9, 10].

Let's dwell on them in more detail. Unconventional warfare is the main historical form of armed conflict in the history of mankind, characterized by the following features [1, 2, 3].

1. Uncertainty of the subject of waging war in terms of international law due to its absence.
2. Irregularity of methods of conducting armed struggle in terms of international law.
3. Absence of "combatant" and "non-combatant" categories.
4. Uncertainty of the causes of armed conflicts and the dominance of ideological, primarily religious, considerations over political and economic ones.
5. Insignificant dependence of the armed formations of any of the warring parties on the state of development of the national economy.
6. Absence of national states in the modern sense of the word.
7. Lack of strict national-state self-identification and, as a result, the spread of the institution of military mercenaries.

It should be noted that the lack of any regulation in no way affected the very essence of the war as an armed conflict [1, 5]. The clearly expressed extensiveness of the development of the world economy in the traditional agrarian societies of that time required taking into account the seasonal requirements of the agricultural calendar in the organization and conduction of warfighting. No state could afford such a phenomenon as mobilization, because hunger killed faster than war. Such a state led to the inevitable elitization of military affairs, when the political and administrative elite of any society was at the same time a military caste, called to defend its dominant position with armed force against any external and internal challenges. It was this stratum of any society that physically had the time and opportunity to realize their own interests and the need to protect them, since the vast majority of the population decided primarily the issue of physical survival.

However, progress did not stop. The civilizational development of mankind took place in such a way that the cost of each new and significant change in the socio-economic development of mankind far exceeded the previous one, at the same time drastically changing the way of life of the vast majority of the population. The revolutionary changes that took place in European society during the Renaissance contributed to the emergence of a completely new socio-political and economic reality, which inevitably changed war as one of the ways of human being [1, 5].

European history XVII ct. in many ways determined the subsequent military and political picture of the world. The thirty-year war on the territory of Germany, in which the vast majority of European states participated, ended with the conclusion of the Peace of Westphalia. The main provisions of this peace agreement became the basis for the formation of a new era in the development of conventional warfare [1, 5]. The following signs were characteristic of this type of war.

1. Determination of the subject of waging war in terms of international law (national states), the existence of which was recognized diplomatically with the conclusion of relevant agreements.
2. Gradual formation of universally recognized international law, customs and rules of warfare.
3. Regulation of methods of conducting armed struggle.
4. Definition of the categories "combatant" and "non-combatant", consolidation of the principle of non-participation on the part of the civilian population in the practice of conducting warfighting.
5. The growing importance of political and economic reasons for the emergence of armed conflicts compared to ideological, primarily religious considerations, the emergence of the concept of national interests of the state.
6. Progressive increase in the dependence of the armed formations of any warring party on the state of development of the national economy.
7. The formation of national states in the modern sense of the word.
8. The formation of national-state ideology and self-identification and, as a result, the transformation of the institution of military mercenaries into national regular armies of the mercenary type.

The transition from extensive to intensive methods of production in the national economies of European states caused an explosive growth in the importance of scientific and technical progress in the military sphere [1–5]. Firearms changed the rules of the game on the battlefield, from tactics to strategy. The role of diplomacy grew sharply. The search for reliable allies has become one of the main strategic tasks of the military and political leadership of any state. In European politics, a strategic system of checks and balances was formed, which was based on the common interests of the states, and not on ideology. The development of education and science contributed to the expansion of the circle of people in society who were interested in politics and its consequences.

From now on, success in warfare depended not so much on the number of armed men that the lords or leaders put on the battlefield, but on their equipment, training and provision. The "gunpowder" revolution separated the army from society as a structure exclusively concerned with security issues. The elite is separated into military and political, since the simultaneous performance of functions becomes impossible. Management of modern armed forces at that time required a much higher level of training and professionalism from both commanders and soldiers. Military leaders by merit or origin are transformed into the officer corps of European armies, a permanent system of professional training of military personnel and a system of training of officer preparation emerge. Literacy and education are indispensable conditions for the successful professional development of military personnel. These changes are especially noticeable in the sailing navy and artillery – the first types and types of armed forces, entirely and completely generated by scientific and technical progress.

It was during this period that the formation of the so-called trinitarian structure began, the essence of which was brilliantly revealed by K. Clausewitz in his work "Vom Krieg" [2, 3]. The government, the army, and the people are the three components of this theory, which reflected the actual state of affairs in the military-political paradigm of that times. Until now, there was no talk of a trinitarian structure of the state, since the army did not stand out from it, but remained at the same time a component of the government and part of the people or a conglomerate of professional military mercenaries without any national self-identification [1, 5].

The realization of the new reality brought about changes in the process of waging wars by European states. From now on, wars were started by governments, officially announcing their beginning to the enemy through diplomatic channels – ambassadors or embassies, with the publication of an official state document. The government formed, equipped, maintained, and supplied the army in both peacetime and wartime. In peacetime, the army prepared for warfights, and after the declaration of war, it concentrated and went on a campaign, hoping to discover the enemy army and defeat it on the battlefield in one or more battles on land or at sea. The defeat of the enemy's armed forces was considered a victory in the war, after which governments entered into diplomatic negotiations on the terms of a peace agreement between the warring parties. Another option was the exhaustion of the parties to the conflict, which made further warfights impossible, and the war ended with diplomatic efforts to formally fix the status quo.

The main tasks of the population were to maintain loyalty to the current government, pay taxes on time, and fulfill their obligations. Governments obliged their armies not to subject the civilian population to any oppression, both in their own and occupied territories. The civilian population was officially considered to be outside the process of warfights and not an object of hostilities by the enemy army. In return, the occupying army demanded loyalty and law-abiding behavior from the population of the occupied territories. States did not consider either their own or foreign populations as a resource for waging war [1–5].

This relatively civilized form of warfare later became known as conventional warfare. It should also be noted that in colonial wars, European states usually did not adhere to the rules of conventional warfare for ideological reasons: the states and peoples that became objects of colonial expansion were not considered civilized enough to adhere to the rules and practices that had developed in European wars of that time. Therefore, it is appropriate to consider the colonial wars of European states as unconventional, that is, as belonging to the previous type.

The final formation of the first period of the existence of the conventional paradigm of warfare is obviously connected with the decisions of the Congress of Vienna in 1815. It formulated the basic provisions of international diplomatic practice, forming the so-called "European Concert" – an informal association of major European states, whose political contradictions could be resolved on the battlefield. In one form or another, the "European Concert" existed until the beginning of World War I. It was within its framework that the first attempts at international legal regulation of the customs and rules of warfare took place: the St. Petersburg Conference of 1868 and the Hague Conference of 1899. The latter ended with the signing of the Hague Convention, a basic international agreement that is still in force [1–5].

The European wars of the first period of the existence of conventional wars took place in conditions of approximately the same military and technical level of their participants. This period lasted until the

beginning of the Crimean War, in which a broad international coalition with the participation of Great Britain, France, Turkey and Sardinia conducted active warfighting on the territory of Crimea, the Caucasus, as well as in the waters of the Black, White and Okhotsk Seas. The crushing defeat of the Russian Empire in the Crimean War showed that the geopolitical paradigm of war was rapidly changing. For the first time, the fate of the war was decided not directly by the armed forces on the battlefield, but by management, economics, and logistics. The expeditionary corps of the European states was better managed and coordinated than the Russian troops and fleet in the theaters of war, the military-political leadership of the coalition countries acted much more effectively than the military-political leadership of the Russian Empire. The economic development of Great Britain and France ensured the total military-technical dominance of the coalition forces both on land and at sea. The logistics of the coalition forces were carried out by sea, which significantly reduced and simplified the provision of expeditionary forces. The foreign policy isolation of the Russian Empire was achieved, and powerful information support for the war in the world was provided by the British and French press. The lessons of the Crimean War gave impetus to the formation of new views on the strategy of warfare, based on the use of three basic principles: mobilization, concentration, and administration.

The consequence of these changes was the creation in the second half of the 19th century in the vast majority of European countries of such a specific permanent body of military management as the general headquarters. It was entrusted with the preparation for war in peacetime and the management of war in wartime.

The next step was the adoption of laws on universal military service, which made it possible to move from a regular mercenary army to a regular national army by conscription, turning the population into a mobilization resource.

The development of logistical systems (communications and transport) made it possible to apply the principles of mobilization and concentration on a strategic (nationwide) scale. The transfer of control of German railways to the Great Prussian General Headquarters during the Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian wars clearly demonstrated to the world the possibilities and potential of the new system of war management as a socio-economic phenomenon.

The revolutionary changes associated with the formation of European nations and the formation of new-type states also led to new approaches to the ideological support of war. The state finally paid attention to the ideological training of its own citizens, thus ensuring the unconditional loyalty of mass conscript armies. The transition to universal military service rapidly increased the mobilization resource of any country due to the sharp increase in the number of male population receiving basic military training during conscription. The productivity of the world economy, which was constantly growing, gave reason to hope that in the event of war, mass mobilization would not cause immediate famine and economic collapse, as in previous eras [1–5].

A new time has come, when the potential of the armed forces was measured by the number of accumulated reserves, both human and material, the speed of their mobilization, deployment and concentration in crucial areas, the state of the national economy and ideology [5].

Both world wars took place precisely in such a paradigm, which acquired theoretical status through the concept of "total war", first formulated by E. Ludendorff and later used by Nazi Germany. However, even such absolutization did not help Germany realize its claims to world domination.

The end of World War II created a fundamentally new geopolitical situation. Global geopolitical systems are emerging – democratic and totalitarian, which draw into their orbit the vast majority of existing states, in particular those that are freeing themselves from previous colonial dependence. The adoption of nuclear, and later thermonuclear weapons, turns a possible global military conflict between systems into the last in the history of civilization. The result is the formation of a new architecture of international security, the key elements of which are the United Nations, international humanitarian law and world public opinion. Regarding the latter, it should be noted that this lever of influence proved its effectiveness during the Second World War, when the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition managed (and not without reason) to demonize their opponents in the eyes of the rest of the world.

This imposes a lot of restrictions on the strategy and forces military theorists to think about how to achieve success in war in the new conditions. At the same time, the theory was developed taking into account the undesirability of a global military conflict between the military-political blocs of NATO and the WTO. The solution was formulated by G. Moltke Sr.: "Think globally, act locally". If it is impossible to succeed in one global conflict, it must be replaced by success in several small ones. Decolonization becomes the battlefield between the blocs.

The efforts of both superpower states – the USA and the Soviet Union, aimed at the destruction of the world colonial system, were not idealistic in nature. The policies of both countries were guided by tough pragmatic

considerations. The "white man's burden" was replaced by the awareness of the commonality of the economic and ideological interests of the newly formed countries with the two main trends of world progress of that time.

As soon as one of the superpower states was personally involved in an armed confrontation, the other immediately began to do everything possible to help the direct enemy. Vietnam and Afghanistan were classic examples of such global traps.

The consequence of the rethinking of the strategy of conducting armed conflicts was the rejection of attempts to create armed forces in third world countries comparable to the armed forces of the aggressor country. Figuratively speaking, instead of pitting an elephant against an elephant, a flock of mice was now pitted against an elephant. Such an erosion of one of the subjects of the armed conflict led to the absolute helplessness of traditional armed formations designed to counteract the same gigantic enemy systems. In the new conditions, totality turned out to be the greatest drawback of the old system. The "friction" that K. Clausewitz so often emphasized destroyed flexibility and efficiency [1–5].

In these conditions, military theorists began to think about how to counter new challenges. The answer to them was the concept of the so-called hybrid war, which envisaged a transition from totality to selectivity in the use of armed force. Precision instead of power, flexibility instead of invincibility, creativity instead of a template, mobility instead of stability - new recipes for success in radically changed conditions.

A new era was forming in the development of warfare – hybrid [1–5]. This type of warfare was characterized by the following features.

1. The uncertainty of the subject of warfare in terms of international law (not only national states, but also various organizations, often without any official status), whose existence is not recognized diplomatically with the conclusion of relevant agreements.

2. Gradual ignoring of generally recognized international law, customs and rules of warfare.

3. Rejection of generally accepted regulation of methods of conducting armed struggle.

4. Blurring of the categories of "combatant" and "non-combatant", consolidation in the practice of conducting warfight of the principle of wide involvement and use of the civilian population.

5. The growth of the importance of ideological, political, economic, and informational methods of conducting armed conflicts compared to previous ones.

6. Progressive increase in the dependence of armed formations of any of the warring parties on external support.

7. Shaping world public opinion in one's own favor, ensuring a favorable "picture" of the combat zone.

8. Erosion of basic political and economic ideologies, national-state ideology and self-identification and, as a result, the revival and transformation of the institution of military mercenaries in the form of private military companies.

The main reason for the changes was the collapse of the bipolar military-political system that had existed in the world since the end of World War II. The collapse of the soviet union ended the arms race and the Cold War. It seemed to everyone in the world that the goal of the global war for world domination had lost its meaning: a purely military victory was no longer needed by anyone. Its price and consequences would clearly not correspond to the achieved result.

Thus, the end of the era of global military-political confrontation in 1991 ushered in a new historical era. According to F. Fukuyama's apt expression, we were to experience the so-called "end of history," an era of world peace, when the full-scale use of armed force by modern states would become impossible. The world entered a new era with hope, sincerely hoping that humanity had already reached the desired level of development that would allow it to move exclusively to peaceful coexistence.

Military theorists and practitioners, comprehending the challenges dictated by the new reality, unanimously spoke out that the traditional armed forces of states in the new world reality are too large, low-intensity conflicts do not require either the quantity or the capabilities of conventional weapons that have already been accumulated, and modern digital technologies are capable of ensuring the control and dominance of a small number of professional units [11, 12, 13].

The next stage in understanding the new military-political reality was the idea expressed by M. van Creveld that the so-called "world according to Clausewitz" and the trinitarian structure (people, government, army) described in his "Vom Krieg" no longer meet modern challenges [1–5], and the general picture of war as a phenomenon strictly limited by international conventions, that is, a conventional war in which combatants fight exclusively with combatants, is no longer possible in the modern world.

This state of affairs has shaped several myths that have become the cornerstone of political and military strategies in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, both in theory and in practice [1–5].

The first of these is the myth of the rules of the military paradigm of the geopolitical game that are mandatory for all players.

The second is the myth that politics can stop armed escalation at any moment.

The third myth: full-scale military conflicts are impossible in regions like Europe.

The axiomatic nature of these approaches, which is obvious at first glance, naturally gave rise to the ideological dogmatism of the vast majority of the population of countries that, with good reason, consider themselves civilized. A rational, regulated world seemed comfortable and cozy. It did not even allow for the possibility of serious security threats. Global challenges – ecology, economy, migration – did not require forceful solutions [1–5].

However, the philosophy and technology of the art of war have remained virtually unchanged for about 2.500 years. The famous British military expert B. L. Hart, the man who invented the concept of armored troops in the 20th century, author of the treatise "The Strategy of Indirect Action", wrote that nothing new in military strategy has been invented since the time of the ancient Chinese philosopher and general Sun Tzu (5th century BC). Two bloody wars – the First and Second World Wars – occurred only because European strategists were poorly acquainted with the teachings of Sun Tzu and were guided exclusively by the teachings of K. Clausewitz, which from the second half of the 19th century dominated the military academies and general staffs of the West. The first place in importance in war was given by K. Clausewitz directly to actions on the battlefield. Meanwhile, Sun Tzu put the battle only in third place, after "destroying the enemy's plans" (first place) and "destroying his alliances" (second place). The combination of conventional and unconventional methods of warfare led to the emergence of hybrid warfare, which was rightly considered the pinnacle of military theoretical thought of the last three decades [1–5].

However, the events of February 2022 have convincingly demonstrated that war in the traditional sense is still relevant. On the one hand, the military conflict between Ukraine and the Russian Federation has all the classic features of trinitarian conventional wars [6, 10, 14]. On the other hand, approaches to conducting combat operations have undergone changes under the influence of the previous three decades of development of military theory and practice. Thus, for the first time in a conventional armed conflict, one of the parties used illegal armed formations – the so-called private military companies – on the largest scale, turning them into the same military instrument of the state as conventional armed forces and providing them with such means of armed struggle that are not required in low-intensity conflicts – artillery, aviation, tanks, air defense and electronic warfare [13].

We are talking about "wagner", "storm z" and other similar groups, which were recruited on the territory of the Russian Federation directly in places of imprisonment, promising amnesty for previous offenses committed on the territory of Russia in exchange for participation in warfighting. It is clear that for such a contingent, compliance with any legal norms in the temporarily occupied Ukrainian territories was not relevant at all [15].

These events clearly demonstrated the powerlessness of supranational political institutions in a situation where the aggressor country acts without any observance of the established rules of the game, that is, does not hit opponents and judges over the head with a chessboard. The main consequences of this aggression formed the basis of the next era in the development of war – post-conventional. The following features are characteristic of this type of war.

1. Return to the certainty of the subjects of warfare in terms of international law (nation states), whose existence is mutually recognized through diplomatic channels with the conclusion of relevant agreements.

2. Cynical, open and purposeful disregard for generally recognized international law, customs and rules of warfare, blocking any possibilities for diplomatic settlement and international intervention using its own international legal status and the support of influential allies.

3. Conscious refusal to regulate the methods of conducting armed struggle, the transition to terrorism by the aggressor state using the entire spectrum of modern non-nuclear weapons, which is one of the methods of conducting armed struggle, as well as one of the determining factors of pressure on the enemy's armed forces and civilian population.

4. Transformation of the institution of military mercenaries into private military companies, which in the conditions of post-conventional war are more effective than national regular armies due to manipulative mechanisms of staffing and providing them with heavy modern weapons and means of destruction.

5. Erosion of the categories of "combatant" and "non-combatant", consolidation of forceful methods of influence on the civilian population in the practice of conducting combat operations.

7. The collapse of nation-states through the formation of quasi-state separatist formations.

8. The destruction of national-state ideologies and ways of self-identification through the information environment.

Therefore, studying the modern international experience of low-intensity military conflicts does not contribute much to increasing the effectiveness of activities to resolve them in the current conditions. The world has frozen on the threshold of a new geopolitical reality, the scale of which exceeds the level of worldview expectations of the vast majority of its population. The new situation will require new complex solutions, the comprehension, understanding and perception of which will be long and painful.

Conclusions

Having considered the issue of substantiating the typification of modern armed conflicts, the following conclusions can be drawn.

1. Post-conventional war is a new paradigm in the development of modern armed conflicts, which makes it possible to significantly eliminate the systemic limitations inherent in armed conflicts of previous types (unconventional, conventional and hybrid in nature).

2. The characteristic features of post-conventional warfare are as follows: a return to the certainty of the subjects of warfare in terms of international law (nation states); purposeful ignoring of generally recognized international law, customs and rules of warfare using one's own international legal status and the support of influential allies; conscious refusal to regulate the methods of conducting armed struggle, the transition of the aggressor state to terrorism using the entire spectrum of modern weapons; transformation of the institution of military mercenaries into private military companies; blurring of the categories of "combatant" and "non-combatant"; progressive increase in the dependence of armed formations of any of the warring parties on technological and economic assistance from third parties; collapse of nation-states and destruction of national-state ideologies and methods of self-identification through the information environment.

3. Developing effective concepts for responding to the challenges posed by post-conventional war is a complex and long-term process for both the world community and the states that have become victims of aggression. Therefore, the consideration of the problems it creates and the ways to respond to them is becoming more relevant. Therefore, the prospect of further research is seen in the need to form scientifically based views on the modern military conflict (post-conventional war) and the ways to respond to the systemic challenges it creates.

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The article was submitted to the editorial office on 29.11.2024

УДК 304.444:355.01

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ТЕОРЕТИКО-МЕТОДОЛОГІЧНЕ ОБҐРУНТУВАННЯ ПОНЯТТЯ ПОСТКОНВЕНЦІЙНОЇ ВІЙНИ ЯК НОВОЇ ФОРМИ ЗБРОЙНИХ КОНФЛІКТІВ СУЧАСНОСТІ

Розглянуто тезу, що переконливо свідчить про постійну еволюцію форм збройних конфліктів в історії людства. Війна є найвищою формою збройного конфлікту. За час свого існування людство пройшло складний шлях трансформації війни як явища. Проаналізовано розвиток явища війни та його головні ознаки з огляду на історичний контекст.

Основними типами війн в історичній ретроспективі виступають неконвенційні, конвенційні та гібридні. Виявлено їх спільні та відмінні ознаки.

Сфокусовано увагу на глобальності трансформації явища війни внаслідок впливу соціально-економічного, політичного та правового розвитку суспільства, а також на основних світоглядних міфах, що виникають у процесі цієї трансформації.

Обґрунтовано причини запровадження поняття «постконвенційна війна» як нової форми збройних конфліктів, що має низку істотних відмінностей від попередніх війн.

Здійснено наукове осмислення парадигми постконвенційної війни та визначено її головні ознаки й відмінності від збройних конфліктів попередніх типів (неконвенційних, конвенційних, гібридних).

Доведено необхідність теоретичного осмислення досвіду постконвенційної війни, вироблення дієвих концепцій реагування на системні виклики, які вона створює.

Ключові слова: збройний конфлікт, постконвенційна війна, конвенційна війна, гібридна війна.

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